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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Should the Court uphold the trial court's decision, and 
decline to review Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence, where Defendant does not enumerate all the incriminatory 
facts and/or inferences against him? 
Should the Court uphold the trial court's decision, following 
a bench trial, to find Defendant guilty of Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, where Defendant was passed out 
behind the wheel of a running vehicle, where Defendant showed 
multiple signs of compromised coordination, balance and coherence, 
and where Defendant admitted that he was taking medication that was 
not his own? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"A trial court's verdict in a criminal trial will be set aside 
only if that verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence or 
xif the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made.'" City of Orem v. Lee, 846 
P.2d 450, 452 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 
P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)) . 
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APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502. Driving under the influence 
of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both or with 
specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration. 
(1) A person may not operate or be in actual physical 
control of a vehicle within this state if the person: 
(a) has sufficient alcohol in the person's 
body that a subsequent chemical test shows 
that the person has a blood or breath alcohol 
concentration of .08 grams or greater at the 
time of the test; 
(b) is under the influence of alcohol, any 
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and 
any drug to a degree that renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle; 
(c) has a blood or breath alcohol concen-
tration of .08 grams or greater at the time of 
operation or actual physical control. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based 
upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and 
alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon 
grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) A violation of this section includes a violation 
under a local ordinance similar to this section adopted 
in compliance with Section 41-6a-510. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, David Kole Wright, was charged, by Information, 
with Driving on a Suspended or Revoked Operators License (Alcohol 
Related), pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 53-3-227 (3) (a), 
and Driving under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6a-502. R. 1-3. Plaintiff later 
dismissed the suspension charge prior to trial, R. 41:4, and the 
trial court convicted Defendant of DUI. R. 41:31. 
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The court arraigned Defendant on May 11, 2009, R. 6-8, the 
parties participated in a pretrial conference on June 22, 2009, R. 
12, and the court tried the matter on July 20, 2009. R. 41. At the 
conclusion of the bench trial, the court found Defendant guilty of 
DUI. R. 41:31. The trial court then sentenced Defendant on 
September 14, 2009. R. 26-28. His sentence included 180 days jail, 
with 170 days suspended, a fine of $1250, and a 30-month term of 
probation. R. 26-28. On October 13, 2009, Defendant, through his 
trial/appellate counsel, Joel D. Berrett, filed his Notice of 
Appeal. R. 30-31. 
Defendant's conviction for DUI stems from his activities on 
November 10, 2008. R. 41:6. On that date, dispatch informed the 
Roosevelt City police that there were reports of a man who appeared 
to be passed out in his vehicle at the Western Hills Motel in 
Roosevelt. R. 41:6. Officer Henry McKenna, a police officer with 
more than nine years of experience, R. 41:25, and an employee of 
the Roosevelt Police Department, responded to the site, and 
encountered "several people flaggfing] [him] down,7' R. 41:6-7, to 
point out a Suburban with a male who appeared to be passed out in 
the driver's seat. R. 41:7. The vehicle "was right at the entrance 
to the west side of the parking lot." R. 41:6. Officer McKenna 
approached the vehicle, and found that the vehicle was running with 
the keys in the ignition, R. 41:7-8, that the driver, was "slumped 
over," R. 41:8, appearing unconscious, R. 41:7, and that the 
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driver, "at some point[,] had lit a cigarette in his mouth and it 
had burned out . . . [leaving] ashes all over his chest." R. 41:7. 
The driver was later identified as Defendant, David Kole Wright. R. 
41:7-8. 
Having observed Defendant's condition, Officer McKenna 
"pound[ed] on the windows trying to wake [Defendant]." R. 41:9. All 
told, in his efforts to rouse Defendant, the officer knocked on the 
car windows and the car door for "probably 15 to 20 minutes." R. 
41:9. Defendant, however, "[d]idn't flinch, didn't move, didn't do 
anything." R. 41:9. Defendant was breathing, but was utterly 
unresponsive. R. 41:10. 
Having spoken with the management of the motel, Officer 
McKenna located Defendant's motel room and talked with Defendant's 
girlfriend, who said that she did not have additional keys for the 
vehicle. R. 41:10. The officer then attempted to use a rod, 
utilized for unlocking vehicles, to gain entry to Defendant's 
Suburban. R. 41:10. The officer did not have much success unlocking 
the doors, but, in his attempts, he "bumped [Defendant] several 
times" with the rod. R. 41:10. After these nudges, Defendant 
"move[d] a little bit, so [the officer] continued to prod him with 
the pole to . . . wake him." R. 41:10-11. The officer persisted for 
about five minutes, at which time Defendant awakened. R. 41:11. 
At that point, "[Defendant] was very disoriented . . . . It 
took him a minute to even function to roll the window down." R. 
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41:11. Officer McKenna asked Defendant to step out of the vehicle. 
R. 41:11. The officer also invited Defendant to turn off the 
vehicle's engine, and "[i]t took [Defendant] another minute to do 
that." R. 41:11. "[Defendant] . . . tr[ied] to find where to turn 
it off. . . . [I]t took him a second to maneuver to turn the 
vehicle off. . . . [T]hen he took the keys in and out . . . of the 
ignition several times." R. 41:11. 
Once Defendant discontinued inserting and removing the keys 
from the ignition, he attempted to exit the vehicle, and Officer 
McKenna "had to grab him because he almost fell over." R. 41:12. 
The officer also assisted Defendant in standing and proceeding to 
the back of the vehicle, R. 41:12, and Defendant had to lean 
against the vehicle to keep from falling over. R. 41:15. When asked 
about whether Defendant performed any field sobriety tests, Officer 
McKenna replied, "We did try to do that, but he was so - so 
physically unable to maneuver, I didn't feel like it was a safe 
opportunity to do that." R. 41:12. 
In speaking with Officer McKenna during their initial 
interaction, Defendant denied having consumed any alcohol, R. 
41:13, and Officer McKenna detected no odor of alcohol or 
marijuana, R. 41:22-23, but, either during that conversation or 
during an encounter later that day, Defendant conceded to Officer 
McKenna that Defendant had been taking medication, and that it was 
not Defendant's medication. R. 41:21. Officer McKenna was able to 
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observe Defendant for about 20 to 30 minutes after Defendant exited 
the vehicle, and Defendant's "abilities never improved at all," R. 
41:14. Not only did Defendant lack balance and have difficulty with 
his keys once he was jarred from his inert state, but he also 
searched through his wallet approximately six times in a feckless 
effort to retrieve his driver's license, before Officer McKenna 
finally intervened to find the license for Defendant, R. 41:15, and 
Defendant became "verbally abusive" and "disorderly" with the 
officers, R. 41:14, resulting in his being placed in a police 
vehicle for a time due to this misbehavior and because "he . . . 
couldn't stand up." R. 41:14. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant does not fully marshal the evidence. While he 
includes many of the facts supporting the decision of the trial 
court, he also neglects important facts and inferences. 
Consequently, he has not met the burden of marshaling the evidence, 
and the Court need not consider his challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence. 
Even if the Court does consider Defendant's challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence, there is sufficient evidence to 
support the trial court's verdict. The testifying officer found 
Defendant passed out behind the wheel of a vehicle which had its 
engine running. Defendant was unresponsive to pounding on the 
vehicle and awoke only after being prodded, with a device utilized 
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to unlock doors, for roughly five minutes. Once stirred from his 
slumber, Defendant demonstrated multiple manifestations of 
impairment, and his poor condition was not tempered by the time 
period of 20 to 30 minutes that the officer observed Defendant once 
he exited his vehicle. Moreover, either during the initial 
interaction that the officer had with Defendant or during an 
encounter later in the day, Defendant informed the officer that he 
was taking medication and that the medication was not his own. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT FAILS TO ADEQUATELY MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE, 
AND THE COURT, THEREFORE, NEED NOT CONSIDER HIS 
CHALLENGE TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE. 
When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, a 
defendant "must marshal all of the evidence in support" 
of the trial court's findings and then establish that the 
evidence, including all reasonable inferences, is 
insufficient to support the findings. Where an appellant 
fails to marshal the evidence, th[e] [C]ourt need not 
consider that challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence in support of the findings. Rather, th[e] 
[C]ourt will assume that the record supports the findings 
of the trial court. 
Bountiful City v. Stewart, 2006 UT App 483 (unpublished decision) 
(quoting State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, flll, 999 P.2d 1252) . "In 
order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, 
the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, 
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which 
supports the very findings the appellant resists." State v. Coonce, 
2001 UT App 355, 16, 36 P.3d 533 (quoting West Valley City v. 
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Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)) 
(emphasis in original). 
In the instant case, Defendant sets forth many of the facts 
unfavorable to him, but also neglects important facts. Defendant, 
for example, fails to note that Defendant "didn't flinch, didn't 
move, didn't do anything" when Officer McKenna pounded on the 
vehicle, R. 41:9; that it took Defendant "a minute" to get out of 
the car once he rolled the window down, R. 41:11, because he had to 
"try[] to find where to turn [the vehicle] off" and "he took the 
keys in and out of the ignition several times," R. 41:11, once the 
vehicle was turned off, R. 41:11-12; that Officer McKenna "tr[ied]" 
to have Defendant perform field sobriety tests, but, because 
Defendant "was so physically unable to maneuver, [the 
officer] didn't feel . . . it was . . . safe," R. 41:12; and that, 
in the 20 to 30 minutes that Officer McKenna observed Defendant 
after he exited the vehicle, "[Defendant's] abilities never 
improved at all." R. 41:14. 
Hence, Defendant omits important facts. He also does not 
marshal the inferences to be drawn from the facts, such as the 
reasonable conclusion that Defendant's state of impairment was so 
severe that it was due to an intoxicant, particularly when his 
impairment was coupled with his admission that he was taking 
medication that was not his own. In sum, Defendant does not marshal 
all of the evidence, and the marshaling of some of the evidence or 
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even the "marshal [ing] of 'most' of the evidence," Coonce, 2001 UT 
App 355, 15, is not enough to meet the marshaling requirement. Id. 
at 56. 
II. SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE CONVICTION OF 
DEFENDANT, WHERE DEFENDANT EXHIBITED SEVERELY 
IMPAIRED ABILITIES, AND WHERE HE ADMITTED THAT HE 
HAD CONSUMED MEDICATIONS WHICH WERE NOT HIS OWN. 
"When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, 
[the Court] must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is 
^against the clear weight of the evidence, or if [the Court] 
otherwise reach[es] a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been made.'" State v. Gordon, 2004 UT 2, 55, 84 P. 3d 1167 
(quoted authorities omitted). "Additionally, Ain those instances in 
which the trial court's findings include inferences drawn from the 
evidence, [the Court] will not take issue with those inferences 
unless the logic upon which their extrapolation from the evidence 
is based is so flawed as to render the inference clearly 
erroneous.'" State v. Briggs, 2008 UT 75, 511, 197 P. 3d 628 (quoted 
and cited authorities omitted). 
"In Utah, a person may be convicted of DUI if he is driving or 
has actual physical control of a vehicle . . . [and] is under the 
influence of alcohol, drugs, or any combination Ato a degree that 
renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle.'" State 
v. Dyke, 2009 UT App 369, 534, 645 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (quoting Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6a-502 (1)) . In the instant case, the trial court's 
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determination that Defendant was guilty of DUI was supported by 
sufficient evidence. 
Defendant was found behind the wheel of a vehicle, with the 
keys in the ignition and the engine running. R. 41:8-9. He was 
clearly in actual physical control of the vehicle. 
Furthermore, he was undeniably impaired. Officer McKenna found 
Defendant passed out, with a cigarette in his mouth and ashes on 
his chest. R. 41:7-8. The officer attempted to awake Defendant, 
but, despite his pounding on the vehicle door and windows for 15 to 
20 minutes, Defendant did not budge. R. 41:9. Thereafter, Officer 
McKenna prodded Defendant with a pole for about five minutes, 
before Defendant finally awoke. R. 41:10-11. At that point, though 
awakened, Defendant "was very disoriented,'''' R. 41:11, and "[i]t 
took him a minute to . . . roll the window down." R. 41:11. Once 
the window was down, Defendant had difficulty turning off the 
engine, and then injected the keys into, and withdrew the keys 
from, the ignition "several times." R. 41:11. As Defendant stepped 
out of the vehicle, Officer McKenna "had to grab him because he 
almost fell over." R. 41:12. Defendant then had to lean against the 
vehicle to keep from falling. R. 41:12. In fact, Defendant's 
balance was so deficient that Officer McKenna did not believe it 
was safe for Defendant to attempt field sobriety tests. R. 41:12. 
Simply stated, Defendant "couldn't stand up." R. 41:14. Defendant's 
impairment was also manifest by his inability to recover his 
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driver's license from his wallet after roughly six attempts and his 
"verbally abusive" and "disorderly" actions channeled at the 
officers. R. 41:14. What is more, in the 20 to 30 minutes that 
Officer McKenna observed Defendant after Defendant exited the 
vehicle, Defendant's "abilities never improved at all." R. 41:14. 
There can be no question that Defendant was unable to safely 
operate a motor vehicle. 
Finally, there is sufficient evidence that Defendant's 
condition was due to drug use. Defendant was very impaired, but 
denied having imbibed any alcohol, R. 41:13, and Officer McKenna 
detected no odor of alcohol or marijuana. R. 41:13, 22-23. 
Additionally, Defendant admitted that he had been taking medication 
and that it was "[n]ot his medication." R. 41:21. No evidence was 
offered as to any other cause for Defendant's state, R. 41, other 
than that he was under the influence of medications that were not 
his own. 
Defendant advances two alleged defects in the trial court's 
decision. He first claims that "the trial court ignored . 
evidence indicating that [he] was not impaired by drugs or 
alcohol." Appellant's Br. at 13. Defendant, however, points to 
nothing in the record supporting the position, propounded in his 
brief, that "[b]ased on the other officer's [sic] observation [sic] 
they did not think he was under the influence [sic] any alcohol or 
drugs and told officer [sic] McKenna not to get a blood draw." 
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Appellant's Br. at 13. Indeed, the testimony of Officer McKenna was 
that an agreement was made with Defendant's girlfriend to take 
Defendant and leave town. R. 41:19. The reasons for that decision 
were not made a part of the record, and the officer in no way 
alluded to any purported disagreement among the officers as to 
Defendant's impairment or the cause thereof. 
Next, Defendant alleges that the trial court inappropriately 
shifted the burden of proof to him.1 The trial court, however, did 
not shift the burden of proof. The court noted that there was no 
evidence to support any finding that Defendant's impairment was due 
to anything other than medication, and then stated: "Now, that 
doesn't prevent the [cjourt from finding reasonable doubt based 
upon the fact that all we have is the statement that he'd been 
taking medication. But that statement seems to explain his 
condition, and there's no other explanation." R. 41:31. Indeed, 
whether Defendant told the officer that he had been taking 
medication, which was not his own, during the morning interaction 
i 
It does not appear that this issue was adequately briefed by 
Defendant, and "[i]t is well established that a reviewing court 
will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed." State 
v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998). As noted in Thomas, 
briefing "requires not just bald citation to authority but 
development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that 
authority. . . . [The appellate] court[s] [are] not a^ depository 
in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research.'" Id; at 305 (quoted authorities omitted). In his brief, 
Defendant cites to a broad statement of the efficacy of the beyond 
a reasonable doubt standard, Appellant's Br. at 14, without 
offering authorities addressing the specific shortfall he alleges. 
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or at the time of Defendant's second meeting with th€> officers 
later that day, the logical conclusion is that it was the 
medication that spawned his extreme impairment. 
Furthermore, even in cases where a defendant does offer 
evidence contrary to the prosecution's position, which Defendant 
did not, it does not foreclose the Court from finding a defendant 
guilty. In Orem City v. Cornejo, for instance, "Cornejo assert[ed] 
on appeal that the City did not prove his guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt because he presented evidence that conflicted with the 
testimony of the victim." 2003 UT App 396 (unpublished decision). 
This Court, however, rejected Cornejo's argument, explaining that 
Cornejo had not shown that his conviction was unsupported by 
sufficient evidence, but "rather only that the prosecution and the 
defense disagreed on many crucial facts, and [that] it [wa]s for 
the trier of fact to determine the testimony to believe." Id. 
In terms of the general matter of sufficiency of the evidence, 
this Court recently encountered circumstances bearing significant 
similarities to the case at hand. As in the present controversy, in 
Dyke, the defendant contested the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting his DUI conviction. 2009 UT App 369, 133. The Court, 
however, found that "there was ample evidence . . . that Van Dyke 
had consumed enough alcohol to impair his ability to operate a 
vehicle safely," Ld. at 137, recounting the evidence of the 
defendant's slurred speech, glassy eyes and general "conduct . . . 
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exhibit[ing] a lack of control of his actions and impaired 
judgment." Id. 
Courts in other states have likewise found convictions 
supported by sufficient evidence in similar circumstances. In 
McDonald v. City of Aberdeen, for instance, the court found 
sufficient evidence where 
[t]he police officer who responded to the scene testified 
that he found McDonald slumped over the steering wheel 
with the motor running and had to beat on McDonald's 
window several times before waking him. The officer 
further testified that when McDonald finally woke up, he 
was disoriented and looked around as if he was lost. 
Similarly, the officer testified that he could smell a 
strong odor of alcohol emanating from McDonald and that 
when McDonald attempted to exit his car, he had to 
support him because McDonald staggered and almost fell. 
The officer additionally testified that McDonald was 
swaying badly, was very incoherent, and did not know his 
whereabouts. McDonald also admitted, according to Officer 
Perkins, that he had consumed three beers. 
906 So. 2d 774, 776 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). And, in State v. 
Borrelli, the court upheld a conviction under the following 
circumstances: 
Here, the [trial] court found sufficient evidence to show 
that the defendant was impaired and that her impairment 
was caused by a drug or drugs. Specifically, the court 
found that the defendant's vehicle was seen by Hudson 
weaving across the road and being driven erratically. 
Both Adams and Pickering noted the defendant's slurred 
speech, glassy eyes, confusion and disorientation. The 
defendant stumbled when getting out of her vehicle and 
failed two different field sobriety tests. Moreover, the 
defendant admitted at the time of the incident that she 
was having a bad reaction to an allergy pill. The court 
found that she had ingested Tavist-D approximately two 
hours before her arrest. 
94 Conn. App. 846, 857 (2006). 
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In these cases, as in the instant case, no chemical test 
established a particular level of consumption, Dyke, 2009 UT App 
369, f8, McDonald, 906 So. 2d at 776, Borrelli, 94 Conn. App. at 
853-54, but the odor of alcohol and/or admission of intake, as well 
as the defendants' impairment, evinced alcohol or drug use. 
Likewise, Defendant's drug use, in this case, is supported by his 
behavior as well as his admission that he had been taking someone 
else's medication. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff, Roosevelt City, 
respectfully requests that the Court affirm the trial court's 
decision finding Defendant guilty. 
DATED this [**! day of April, 2010. 
ALLRED & McCLELLAN, P.C. 
Attorneys nor Appellee 
Roos^elt C/ity 
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